In Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 358, 17 Am. Rep. 738, one of the questions for determination was if the uniformity of the school system of the state was broken by the establishment of separate schools for colored and for white children. The court said:
"Under our constitution, our common-school system must be general. That is, it must extend over and embrace every portion of the state. It must be uniform. The uniformity required has reference to the mode of government and discipline, the branches of learning taught, and the qualifications as to age and advancement in learning required of pupils as conditions of their admission. It does not mean that all the schools shall be of the same size and grade, or that all the branches of learning taught in one school shall be taught in all other schools, or that the qualifications as to age and advancement, which would admit a pupil in one school, would entitle such pupil to admission into all the other schools. Uniformity will be secured when all the schools of the same grade have the same system of government and discipline, the same branches of learning taught, and the same qualifications for admission."
The word "common" as applied to the system of schools to be established under the constitution clearly refers to grade. A distinction is made between "common schools" and "schools of a higher grade." But if the definition of the plaintiff be adopted the constitution is not violated by the separation of races in the schools. The constitution of Indiana requires that the common schools be "equally open to all." In the decision just referred to the court discussed the bearing of this provision upon the precise question at issue, as follows:
"This system of common schools must consist of many schools in different localities or geographical divisions; and these schools may be of different grades. In some of these localities or divisions there may be schoolhouses, and in others none. In some the schoolhouse or houses may not be sufficient to accommodate all, and the revenue may not be sufficient to provide for them.
"In this system, there ought to be and must be a classification of the children. This classification ought to and will be with reference to some properties or characteristics common to or possessed by a certain number out of the whole; and these classes may be put into and taught in different parts of the same school, or different rooms in the same schoolhouse, or different schoolhouses, as convenience and good policy may require.
"This is too reasonable to admit of question; for it concerns the general good, and does not affect the quality of the privilege, but regulates the manner of its enjoyment.
"This being settled, what is there to prevent the classification of children, equally entitled to the privilege of the system of common schools, with reference to difference of race or color, if the judgment of the legislature should hold such a classification to be most promotive of, or conducive to, the good order and discipline of the schools in the system and the interest of the public? . . .
"It being settled that the legislature must provide for the education of the colored children as well as for the white children, we are required to determine whether the legislature may classify such children, by color and race, and provide for their education in separate schools, or whether they must attend the same school without reference to race or color. In our opinion, the classification of scholars, on the basis of race or color, and their education in separate schools, involve questions of domestic policy which are within the legislative discretion and control, and do not amount to an exclusion of either class. In other words, the placing of the white children of the state in one class and the negro children of the state in another class, and requiring these classes to be taught separately, provision being made for their education in the same branches, according to age, capacity, or advancement, with capable teachers, and to the extent of their pro rata share in the school revenue, does not amount to a denial of equal privileges to either, or conflict with the open character of the system required by the constitution. The system would be equally open to all. The tuition would be free. The privileges of the schools would be denied to none. The white children go to one school, or to certain of the schools in the system of common schools. The colored children go to another school, or to certain others of the schools in the system of the common schools. . . .
"In our opinion, there would be as much lawful reason for complaint, by one scholar in the same school, that he could not occupy the seat of another scholar therein at the same time the latter occupied it, or by scholars in the different classes in the same school, that they were not all put in the same class, or by the scholars in different schools, that they were not all placed in one school, as there is that white and black children are placed in distinct classes and taught separately, or in separate schools."
In a very recent case, decided February 6, 1900, the New York court of appeals reached the same conclusion upon an analogous state of facts:
"Again, it is said that the present constitution requires the legislature to provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated, and therefore the school board was required to admit to any school under its control all the children who desired to attend that particular school. Such a construction of the constitution would not only render the school system utterly impracticable, but no such purpose was ever intended. There is nothing in that provision of the constitution which justifies any such claim. The most that the constitution requires the legislature to do is to furnish a system of common schools where each and every child may be educated; not that all must be educated in any one school, but that it shall provide or furnish a school or schools where each and all may have the advantages guaranteed by that instrument. If the legislature determined that it was wise for one class of pupils to be educated by themselves, there is nothing in the constitution to deprive it of the right to so provide. It was the facilities for and the advantages of an education that it was required to furnish to all the children, and not that it should provide for them any particular class of associates while such education was being obtained. In this case, there is no claim that the relator's children were excluded from the common schools of the borough, but the claim is that they were excluded from one or more particular schools which they desired to attend, and that they possessed the legal right to attend those schools, although they were given equal accommodations and advantages in another and separate school. We find nothing in the constitution which deprived the school board of the proper management of the schools in its charge, or from determining where different classes of pupils should be educated, always providing, however, that the accommodations and facilities were equal for all. Nor is there anything in this provision of the constitution which prevented the legislature from exercising its discretion as to the best method of educating the different classes of children in the state, whether it relates to separate classes, as determined by nationality, color, or ability, so long as it provides for all alike in the character and extent of the education which it furnished and the facilities for its acquirement." (People, ex rel. Cisco, v. School Board, 161 N. Y. 598, 56 N. E. 81, 48 L. R A. 115.)